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/

CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS:
The Man and His Works
by
Susan M. Voss

'INTRODUCTION
I

"Claude Levi-Strauss, Professor of Social Anthropology at the College de France, is, by common consent, the most distinguished exponent
~f this particular academic trade to be found
. ap.ywhere outside the English speaking world ... "
(Leach 1970: 7)
With this in mind, I am still wondering how I came to be embroiled
in an attempt not only to understand the mul t:ifaceted theorizing of
Levi-Strauss myself, but to interpret even a portion of this wide
inventory to my colleagues. ' There is much (the maj ori ty, perhaps)
of Claude Levi-Strauss which eludes me yet. To quote Edmund Leach
again, rtThe outstanding characteristic of his writing, whether in
French or in English, is that it is difficul tto unders tand; his
sociological theories combine bafflingcoinplexity with overwhelming erudi tion"., (Leach 1970: 8) . In addition, the whole corpus of
Lev~-Strauss' writings is packed with plays on words, oblique references and puns.' I ask that the reader bear with my tentative
exploration into the mind of this enigmatic man.
EARLY YEARS
/

Claude Levi-Strauss was born in Belgium in 1908, son of a
French Jewish-turned-~gnostic artist who raised his son in an intel
lectual atmosphere of ax' tis tiC: culture and -skepticism. ,Cuddihy
(1974:155) makes much of Levi-Strauss' Jewish heritage, even to the
point of stating that ~he develo~ment of his intellectual.tool,
structuralism, was for the purpose of putting an end to the "trauma
of status-loss inherent in Jewry's entry into the modernized West
in the nineteenth century!'. Cuddihy contends Levi-Strauss uses
this tool for these ends, but I can find little evidence to justify
the contention. Even while having spent his early childhood years
wi th his grandfather, who was (the rabbi of Versailles). LeviStrauss claims, liMy only contact with religion goes back to a stage
in, my 'childhood at which I was already an unbliever" (emphasis
added)(Levi-Strauss 1973b:215).
Levi-Strauss says very little in his published works about his
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childhood and youth. References to this time of his life are
found primarily in the enchanting "travelogue", Tristes
Trop'!qu_~_s, and are also salted sparingly and occasionally in
other puolications. However, Gardner (1973:113) reveals
that he was a "serious and somewhat romantic youngster"
given to long, solitary walks, often ,~using over flora and
fauna, and contemplative of philosophical problems. From
an early age he was deeply interested in geology, later
acknowledging that science as one of the three major intellectual influences in his life. The other two, psychoanalysis and Marxism, which L~vi-Strauss regarded as methods
of science rather than as dogma, joined geology to become
Levi-Strauss' "three mistresses."
All three showed that understanding consists in the reduction of one type of .
reality to another; that true reality is
never the most obvious of realities ... in
all the cases the problem is the same:
the relation between reason and sense
perception ... " (Levi-Strauss 1973b:61)
This question of the relationship between reason ~nd sense
perception effected an'increasing importance in Levi-Strauss'
theorizing over the ensuin~ years.
COLLEGE YEARS

~\JD

EARLY TEACHING CAREER

Between the years 1927 and 1932, Levi-Strauss attended
the University of Paris, graduating under the Faculty of
Law with a degree in Philosophy. (His studies had included
readings of the masters of the "French School of Sociology,"
notably Durkheim and Mauss; in fact, it was Mauss' "Essai
sur Ie Don" which later piqued Le'vi-Strauss' interest in
alliance theory.) Following graduation, Levi-Strauss accepted a position in a French lycee, which he held for two years.
But in 1934, two events occurred which w~re to have lasting
consequence in the life of Levi-Strauss. The first of these
was his reading of Robert Lowie'iPrimitive Society, L6viStrauss' first introduction to specialist anthropological
writing. Enchanted by the life described in this book, he
eagerly took advantage of the opportunity provided by the
second event. Through the patronage of Celestin BougIe,
Director of the Ecole Normale Superieure, Levi-Strauss was
offered a post as Professor of Sociology at the University of
Sao Paulo, Brazil. He accepted within three hours. During
the four years in which Levi-Strauss was at Sao Paulo, he
made several brief visits to the interior of .Brazil, engaging
in ethnographic investigations. The empirical data and
intellectual capital accrued during those 'years have been a
major source of ideas for most of Levi-Strauss' subsequent
works. Levi-Strauss' first anthropological publication was
in 1936 - a forty-five page article on the social organization
of the Bororo Indians.
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In 1938, having resigned from the University of Sao Paulo, he
obtained from the Frerich Government financial support for an extensive expedition to central Brazil. While on the move much of
the time, Levi-Strauss collected enough material on the Nambikwara and Tupi-Kawahib Indians to provide the basis for one of his
best-known publications, Tristes Tropiques. Going in siarch of
infini te variety,. and expecting to -find ei ther bloodthi rsty cannibals or Rousseau-like I'noble savages", Levi-Strauss instead discovered the common humanity of mankind. He came to recognize that
the similarities between himself an.d the long- isolated Nambikwara
far out-weighed the differences. Levi-Strauss' (.recogni tion. of
lICertain fundamental properties of the physical and psychical
universe" (Levi-Strauss 1973b:61), was to become a recurrent theme
in all of his writings. However, it.is important to mention that
in spite of his "vis~onaryrt experience, the actual concrete ethnographic data which Levi-Strauss compiled at this time could not
have been of the quality which we have come to expect from Malinowski-style, fieldwork. IIi ·the whole course of his Brazilian
travels, Levi-Strauss could not have spent more than a few weeks
at a time in anyone place; nor was he ever abl~ to converse
"easily with any of his informants in their native language. In
his subsequent writings, he assumes that the initial "model" generated by an observer's first impressions actually represents
ethnographic reality. It has become apparent in recent etic/emic
anthropological theorizing that such a first stage model can be
little more than the observers' own pre-packaged suppositions.
This type of data can hardly be considered impeachable source
material on which to base the foundation of one's life work. But
my primary criticism of Levi-Strauss in this regard is not that
he has relied so heavily .on. insufficient fieldwork, but that when
called to defend his position wherever other data runs counter to
his theories, he will either by-pass the evidence or sidestep the
issue all together. (cf.Harris 1968: 499-512). Any data is acceptable as long as it correlaies with his calculated expectations.
One Is feminded of Levi-Strauss' training in philosophy and law:~
his behavior is that of an advocate defending· a cause rather
than that of a scientist in pursuit of truth.
What·was perhaps the most pivotal event in the life of
Levi-Strauss was his meeting of the noted linguist Roman
Jakobson in the year 1941. -During the two years prior to this
date, Levi-Strauss had been in France on military service and
had made his way, via Martinique and Puerto Rico, to New York,
where he took up a post at the New School of Social Research,
a position engineered for him by Robert Lowie. It was there
that Jakobson introduced Levi-Strauss to the scientific approach
which had wrought a "revolution" in linguistic study. The
linguistic analysis of the Prague School, of' which Jakobson
was a prominent figure, proposed that underiying the diversity
of languages and phonological components there was a small set
of basic distinctions (binary oppositions) which generated
the diversities. Levi-Strauss seizec. upon this concept,
feeling tllat if one could discover the underlying distinctions
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which generated the diversities of culture, one could present
an accurate and economical descriptlon of the range of cul~
tural manifestations. To implement the tenets of Jakobsoniar
linguistics into cultural anthronology required studying th~
infrastructure of cultural phenomena rather than their apparent manifestations; it is the relationships between the
units of this realm as independent entities, and not the
units themselves which will reveal the structure of a culture.
"It is not a question, naturally, of transferring linguistic
analysis into anthropology, but of translatlng it into anthropological terms" (original emphasis) (Le'vi-Strauss 1963b:37).
However, such structural analysis in linguistics was not so
neatly transferred to the discipline of anthropology. Linguistics deals with signs and symbols which acquire meaning
when cognitively associated with particular objects; but ther(
are no conventional signs or symbols assoicated with social
structure, political organization or family relationships.
Levi-Strauss nevertheless proposed that cultural phenomena
could, for the purpose of analysis, be assigned arbitrary
symbols which would reflect the principle rarameters of cultural domains, and which could be manipulated to reflect .
genuine relationships among the phenomena. By cross-checking
these results against ethnographies and personal observation,
he hoped to confirm the production of empirical correlat~s~
The three principal phases of Levi-Strauss' scholarly works
(i.e. kinship theory, the theory of primitive classification,
and the logic of myth) have been an attempt to implement
this research method -- Structuralism.

<M"~

THE STRUCTURALIST APPROACH
Before discussing the products of Levi-Strauss' Structuralism in the range of study indicated above, it would
perhaps be instructive to consider the general arguments for,
or justifications of, structuralist methodology. During
the years between the first publication of The Elementary
Structures of Kinship (1949) anli the long-overdue publication
of Tristes Tropiques (1955), Levi-Strauss engaged in investigation of certain other aspects of culture in an effoit to
"test" his general concept of structural analysis. Some of
the articles produced by these investigations appeared in
1958 in the form of Structural Anthropology, a collection of
essays which serves as an introductlon to structural dogma.
For those interested in the potential of Structuralism, a
later publication, Totemism (1963). clarifies the actual
techniques of application of the discipline.
The central thesis of Structuralism can be interpreted
as follows: The phenomena of the external worle., which we
perceive through our senses, are apprehended as having distinct characteristics because of the way our senses communicate
these perceptions to the brain and the \'Jay the human brain
interprets these stimuli. It is typical of this process that
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the continuum of perceptions (space, time, etc.) is cut up into
separate units or segments, thereby disposing our conception of
the environment as consistin!! of discrete things belonging to
recognizable, named classes, with the passage of time consisting of sequences of distinct events. Therefore. when men
produce material objects of culture, divise belief systems and
associated ceremonials, and. keep written records of the past,
it is in imitation of their apprehension of nature. All
products of culture, wh~ther material or behavioral, are
patterned after man's perception of nature as segmented and
ordered.
Is this mode of perception truly characteristic of the
human brain in general, or Levi-Strauss' brain in particular?
How does one actually use this explanation to implement structural analysis of phenomena? There is a big step between cause
and effect, and to my way of thinking, a great deal of conj ecture necessary to take this step.
Irrespective of my "lay of
thinking, the following is an example of the "strategy" of the
thesis: Given a continuum, such as the color spectrum, there
is no natural point at which one color changes to another,
for instance, green to yellow or yellow to red. Nevertheless,
the human brain is able to discriminate between ~reen and
yellow, and yellow and red. This "ordering mechanism" allows
for anyone not colorblind to be able to recognize that green
is the opposite of red, and, becuase of this, we may assign
the signals - and + as if they corresponded to green and red.
It is interesting that in many cultures besides our own, red
is consistently treated as a sign of danger, perhaps from
its "natural" association with blood. At any rate, with
traffic lights in our eel ture, green means- GO and red means
STOP. If we need a further signal to indicate intermediate
meaning (about to STOP, about to GO), we choose the color
yellow. This is done because, in the spectrum yellow lies
halfway bet\veen green and red. In this system, then, the
ordering of the colors is the same as that of the instruc~ons:
GO-CAUTION-STOP:green-yellow-red. They both have the same
"structure;'" the one is a transformation of the other, and
the final cultural product, a three-color traffic. si~nal, is
a simplified imitation of a phenomenon of nature as apprehended
by the human brain. However,
!1because this viewpoint offers distinct
advantages, allowing properties of human
societies - what riarcel Mauss called 'facts
of general functioning' - to emerge which
might otherwise remain hidden under a mass
of exotic and incomprehensible surface detail,
how can it guarantee the reality of these
structural categories which exist only at the
l.mconscious level" (VonSturmer 1970:11)?
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In .the above example, the sequence of colors in the
spectrum very neatly transfers to the sequence of colors in
the traffic. signal, and the selection of red for "STOP-DANGER"
seems to be a natural one, as mentioned previously. Therefore, the correlation between the two triads is more or less
predetermined 1 artd we do not need to.ccnsider alternative
possibilities offered by the rest of the matrix. But suppose,
in a general case, that there is no ,pparent correlation
between the. patterns. Strpctural analysis needs to proceed
by setting out all the possible combinations of components
and examining the empirical evidence on a comparative basis.

"TIle method we adopt, . . . cons is ts of
the, following operations:
1. define the phenomenon under study as a
relation between two or more terms, real
or supposed:
11. construct a table of possible permutations
between these terms;
111.' take this table as the general object
of analysis which, at this level only, can
yield ,necessary. connections, the empirical
phenomenon considered at the beginning bein~
only one possible combinati,on among others,
the complete system of which much be const~ucted beforehand" (Levi-Strauss 1963a:16).
The purpose of this exercise is to establish how relations
which are inherent in nature and recognized as such by the
human mind ate used to generate cultural, phenomena involving
the smae relations. It is L6vi-Strauss' contention that by
discovering bow different peoples apprehend nature, it will
be possibl~ to infer crucial facts about 'the mechanism of
thinking as manifested in cultural diversity. It is important to understand that, in spite of the cultural differences
which c~n be observed in cross-cultural comparisons, because
all cultutesare the product of human minds? there must be,
beneath th~surface, f~atures that are universal. These
universals exist only at the level of structure, and never
at the level of manifest fact. Levi-Strauss attaches no
importance to the recurrence'or l.;;lck of occurrence of particular 'customs on a wqrldwide basis. In his view s lITe may
'usefully compare only the patterning of the relations which
might link together sets of human Lehavior; there is nothing
to be gained from comparing single cultural items as isolates.
The general object of analysis is conceived as a kind of
algebraic matrix of possible p~rmutations and combinations
located in the unconscious huma~ mind; the empirical evidence
is merely an example of what is possible.
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liThe structure of relations which can be
discovered by analyzing materials drawn
from anyone culture is an algebraic
transformation of other possible structures
belor-ging to a common set and this common
set constitutes a pattern which reflects an
attribute of the mechanism of all human brains"
(Leach 1970:53).
This is a grand conception, but its usefulness is a matter
of opinion. Among his professional collea~ues, there is
little doubt as to Levi-Strauss' brilliance and fecundity,
but suspicion remains and in some quarters is hardening into
open hostility (HaJ11mel: 1972). One of the reasons for" this, I
believe from my own encounter with the writings of Levi-Strauss,
is that many of his colleagues have not or can not read him!
He is charged with imposing his own mentality on the world,
with endowing the inte~ligible with intelligence, and with
revealing more about Levi-Strauss than about the objects
of his inquiry.
"An analysis of his . . . \<lork is '. ,
illuminating for it reveals~n obsession
with the Nature/Culture opposition and
the notion of alliance. The patterns
of L~vi-Straussi thoughts emerge clearly,
but what of the Indians" (emphasis
added) (VonSturmer 1970:13)?
His is an unfamiliar style of discourse and it must be admitted
that there is an element of verbal sleight of hand which invites caution rather than enthusiasm. _ However, those who
weary of the tortuous gymnastics of Levi-Straussian argument
need to recognize his unique capicity of leading the reader
all unaware into the innermost recesses of his "secret"motivations. Clearly, the abundance of theory generated by LeviStrauss over the past thirty years has been a significant
contribution; while many of his theses remain muddy water to
the uninitiateJ, they have certainly stimulated a flurry of
interest in hi.s "intellectual tool" and by this means, hopefully, . genera ted the kind of research investigation l"hich may
ultimately produce a methodology which could enjoy broadspectrum application. At any rate, Levi-Strauss is not to
be taken lightly.
SCHOLARLY WORKS
Turning to the aspects of Levi-Strauss' scholc71y works,
we may conceive of them as a three-pointed star radiating
around a nucleus of Structuralism. It is beyond the scope of
this paper and my expertise to treat fully th~ entire range
of theory which has sprung from t~e mind of Levi-Strauss.
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But I will attempt to give a brief synopsis of the major POints
on which his primary areas of endeavor pivot.
KINSHIP
.. In his study of kinship, Levi-Strauss proceeds in a
fashl?n.contrarr to most of his predecessors. Rather than
~xpla~n1~g the 1~cest taboo on the ba~is of marriage rules,
he exp1~1ns marr~age ruJes on the bas1s of the incest taboo
In a v~nn smacking of social Darwinism, Levi-Strauss maintains
tha~, 1n th~ ~ourse of evolution, human societies had the
cho1ce of ~1v1ng away their women ~o cement political alliances
or of keep1ng them to themselves and running the risk of b~in~ ,
annihilated by superior enemies. In this situation, natural ~
selection would favor societies enforcing rules of exogamy .. · This
equates with the function of the incest taboo. The fatal flaw
of incest is that it precludes the possibility of formation
of larger kinship systems by .restricting the possibility of
exchanging women and establishing alliances. If survival of
a society is dependent upon al1iance 1 strong sanctions against
incest must be interdicted.
"The primitive and irreducible character
of the kinship unit is a consequence of
the incest taboo . . . In human society
a man cannot get a woman except from
another man, who entrusts him with his
daughter or sister l l (Levi-Strauss 1969a:
41) .

The taboo has no other object than to permit the circulation
or women, and in this sense, is a counterpart of the obligation to give a thesis of Mauss to which Levi-Strauss' contention " . . . that exogamy . . . was the archety~e of all
practices based upon reciprocity, and that marriage alliances
were the essential basis of the social structure" (Gardner
1973:127). But the important thing for Levi-Strauss, in consideration of the incest taboo, is that the existence of this
phenomenon provides the "missing link" in man's transition
from a state of nature to a siate of culture. It was the
first self-sacrifice in sexual matters and all of its attendant subsequent for~s rif reciprocity which elevated man from
an animal state to a cultural state, with language. customs,
and traditions following.
/

To complicate matters, Levi-Straus·s recognizes further
characteristics of these forms of exchange, which he distinguishes by the terms "harmonic" and "disharmonic," a distinction
based on the relationship between rules of residence and
rules of descent. lIe recognizes only two types of descent patrilineal and matrilineal, and two types of resiJence viri1oca1 and uxoriloca1. Systems which are patrilineal/
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virilocal or matrilineal/uxorilocal are harmonic; systems
which arc patrilineal/uxorilocal or matrilineal/virilocal
are cisharmonic. Levi-Strauss maintains that harmonic structures are unstable and that disharmonic structures are stable,
so that structures of the first type will tend to evolve into
structures of the second type. Harmonic systems of restricted
exchange, therefore, provide the foundation from which harmonic
systems of generalized exchange may emerge.
"A harmonic system with restricted exchange, he reasons, can never rise
a.ove a dual organization or a combination
of separate dual organizations; that
is, can never embrace the whole community
in a total exchange system, unless it
becomes either asymmetric or disharmonic"
(Dejong 1952:19).
Regardless of the merits of this argument, it should be pointed
out that Levi-Strauss' general procedure for marriage alliance
analysis is the same as that discussed in an earlier portion
of this paper in the context of traffic signals. He treats
possible preferences for marriage with particular cousins as
forming a set of logical alternatives, compliance with which
results in different overall patterns of social solidarity
within the total society. These different kinship system
possibilities constitute a set of components which are manifested in sets of kinship termsa-nd in illsti tutions of
marriage and exchange. Taken all together, the components
will embody clues as to the internalized logic of the human
mind.
THE Hm'IAN riIND
/

By now it should be cleaT that Levi-Strauss is very
nearly obsessed with the internal working of the human mind,
to the point that he regards anthropology properly as the
study of the mind. Only by the confirmation of his theory
of the brain's operation on the basis of distinction of perception through binary opposition of characteristics, can
Levi-Strauss' position on the nature of cultural manifestations be verified. It was this interest, this need, which
stimulated the composi tion of two of his most eruel i te lvorks,
Totemism and The Savage Mind, both published in 1962. His
purpose -in thIs--enaeav-6-r--was to demonstrate the basic principles of the working of the human mind and to illustrate that
there is no qualitative difference 'between the minds of socalled "primi tives" and minds of sophisticated l\Testerners.
Because of the limitations placed on the mind by such reality
factors as length of lifetime, proximity of other tribes,
availability of women and natural resources, etc., Levi-Strauss'
attention later turned increasingly toward domaIns such as
myth classification, in which, he reasoned? there were fewer
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restraints upon the mind and it could be given free rein to
reveal .its organization and parameters of functioning. These'
efforts culminated in the "Mythologiques" (the logic of myth),
a tetralogy consisting of The Raw and the Cooked (1964),
From Honey to Ashes (1966), On the Origin of Table I'1anners
(1968), and The Naked Han (1972).
--------------Levi-Strauss begins his illustration- of the universal
aspects of the functioning of the human mind by a consideration of the widespread practice of totemism, a phenomenon
which has long been used as an example of a state of primitive
mentality. It is Levi-Strauss' contention that the naming of
individuals or clans after particular plant or animal species
is not due to those individuals or clans thinking themselves
to be, for in~tance, beavers or eagles, nor is it due to the
members living like beavers or eagles; rather as one plant
or animal species differs from another, so do the. members of
one totemic group differ from membe,!'s of another. "It is not
th~ resemblances but the differe~c~s which resemble each oth~r'
(Levi-Strauss 1963a: 63). It is a recognition of a "class
structure," if you will, in the state of nature which is
transferred, 'and therefore analagous ,to, a system of social
ordering in the state of culture. Furthermore, the "primitive'"
does not confei the name of beaver ~r eagle upon his clan
because these creatures provide him with something "good to eat"
(bonnes a manger), but because they provide him with something
"good to think" (bonnes a penser). In other words, totemic
species are not given social value because they are of economic
value, but because the species are considered as categories
which in themselves are, socially valuable. '?They are appropriate vehicles for capturing the perceptual distinctions
which have impressed themselves upon the individual or group-"
(Gardner 1973:135-136). Because all minds perceive stimuli
on the basis of contra,sts and opposi tions, it must also have.
some mechanism for mediation between them. As a result, objects
which are "good to think" are thos'e which embody the opposing
qualities \1hich originally captured the feeling ,of "identi- -, ;~_
fication 'l of the thinker. The very existence of these media,tors
helps to resolve the cqntradictions and, if not that, at least
provides a suspension of the oppo~ti6ns.
"For human (as distinct 'from animal) survival every member of society must learn
to distinguish his fellqw men according
to their mutual social st'atus., ... The
simplest way to do this,'is to apply ti~ns
formations of the animal level categories
to the social classifiCation of human
beings. This is the key point in LeviStrauss' Structuralist approach to the
classic anthropological theme of Totemism"
(Leach 1970:40).
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Clearly, this type of association is evidence of conceptual
thought and the capacity for abstraction.
Levi-Strauss expands on this argument by providing
examples of precise, scientific knowledge on the part of
primitive peoples. (Examples of this kind are common enough
'knowledge among anthropologists, and I will not reiterate
any of them here.) He recognizes in these examples a quality
of scientific knowledge which is not exactly the saMe as that
of the Western scientist, but rather a parallel mode of
acquiring knowledge, which he labels the "science of the concrete." Levi-Strauss maintains that the scientific operations
of both Western adn Primitive societies is based upon the
classification of objects and phenomena. The scie~ce of the
concretei however, engages in~classification by sensory properties, such as odor and appearance, and does not engage in
classification on the basis of anatomical properties or evolutionary development of species. Levi-Strauss establishes
that both modes of acquiring knowledge nevertheless give rise
to organized, self-consistent systems; they.:at;e the products
of identical mental manipulations, differing only in the
types of phenomena under consideration ane the parameters for
qualification for membership in a classification.
Conversely, to. demonstrate that the thought process of
"civilized man" is indeed not so very far removed from that
of "primitives," Levi-Strauss illustrates circumstances in
which Western man unhesitatingly displays primitive reasoning.
An example which very convincingly substantiates this is the
emotional attachment we have to historical documents, landmarks, shrines, etc. When one is told, for instance, that
"George Washington slept here," it is not really crucial
whether or not, in fact, he did. What is important is that
the-person believes that George Washington slept there and
the~eby experiences the appropriate emotion.
In addition,
one can imagine the emotional trauma which would occur should
some sacred family object, such~s Great-G!sndpa's gold watch,
be lost or· damaged. It is as if all the ideals and concepts
of value and permanence associated with these objects were
lost as well. One final example, which would have been
equally volatile amunition for Levi-Strauss' artillery in
the discussion of totemism, should suffice in exp~sing this
tenet.
is a fact of empirical observation
that human .beings everywhere aJort ritual
attitudes tqwards the animals and plarits
in their vicinity. Consider, for example,
th~;separate, and often bizarre, rules
which govern the behaviour of Englishmen
towards the creatures which they classify .
as: Ci) \-vild animals, (ii) foxes,

~lIt
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(iii)' game, (iv) farm animals, (v) pets,
(vi) vermin. Notice further that if we
take the sequence of words: (ia) strangers,
(iia) enemies, (iiia) friends, (iva)
neighbors, (va) companions, (via) criminals ,
the two sets of terms are in some 4egree homo16gous. By a metaphorical usage the categories
of animals could be (and3sometimes are) used
as equivalents for the categories of human
beings. One of Levi-Strauss' major contributions to our understanding has been to
show how very widespread is this kind Qf
socialisation of animal categories" (Leach
1970:40).
It becomes apparent, that "primitives" alone do not have the
corner on primitive reasoning.
To finalize his arguments for the universality of the
structure of thought, Levi-Strauss turns to practices of
naming, classifying, categorizing, universalizing and particularizing. He demonstrates that the rationale for labeling and grouping, while most clearly reflected in the th~n~ing
of primitive societies, is not solely the property of pr1ID1tive societies and that it is not based on utilitarian or
functional considerations. It is Levi-Strauss' thesis that
it is the mind's capacity for and characteristic of sorting,
clustering, opposing and mediating which predetermine its
organization ,of percepts. In demonstration of this assertion,
he goes to great lengths in consideration of Western practices of naming pets, and domestic and wild animals, claiming
that such practices are universal human modes of eX"f)ression
of recognition of attributes. Whether or not such modes of
expression are in fact universal, the discussion does shed
some light on unfamiliar aspects of our own familiar behavior.
The presentation engages in this manner: For us, dogs,
because they are pets, are a part of human sotiety while being
not quite human. This relationship finds expression in the
kinds of names we attach to dogs, names which ar~ like human
names but nearly always slightly different. Birds, on the
other hand, are given nicknames fully comparahleto normal
human names, ~ Jenny Wren, Robin Redbreast, etc. The
difference is---rnat the nnon-human" names given to pet dOQS
are names of individuals, while the "human" names assigned
to birds aee indiscriminately applied to any member of a
whble species. This type of distinction is that of metonymic
vs. metaphoric modes of symbolic association. Levi-Strauss
contends that birds may be given human christian names more
easily than othei animal classes because, since they are so
different, they may be permitted to resemble men! Because of
this ready 'difference between men and birds, and because of
birds' independence of our own soci~ty, it is permissable
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ro recognize those attributes of aviary society whic~l appear to us
as homologous to thit in which we live, i.e., love of freedom,
bui lding of homes and nurturing of the young,. engaging in social
relations, and communicating by acoustic means. . "Consequently
everything objective conspires to. make us think of the bird world
as a metaphorical human society" (Levi:-Strauss 1966: 203). Exactly
the opposite holds true in the case of dogs. Forming an integral
part of human society, and dependent upon it, dogs must be designated in a fashion which imitates but does not duplicate human
designations. The names given to dogs
"are like stage names, forming a series parallel to the names people bear in ordinary life
or, in other words, metaphorical names.' Consequently when the relation between (human
and animal) species is socially conceived as
metaphorical, the relation between the respective systems of naming takes on a metonymical character; and when the relation between species is conceived as metonymical, the
system of naming assumes a metaphorical
character" (Levi-Strauss 1966: 204-205)."
Levi-Strauss then goes on to make further learned generalizations
about the names which French farmers give to thei r COl"S and the
names conferred upon racehorses:
, '''Now the names given to cattle belong to a
differ~nt series f~om birds' or dogs'.
They
are generally descriptive terms referring to
the colour of their coats, their bearing or
temperament: 'Rustaud', 'Rus~et' ,Blanchette',
'Douce I , etc. these names have 'a metaphorical
character but they differ from the names given
to dogs in that ... the former ... tend to derive
from speech (oral tradition), the latter from
language (learned tradition)" (parenthetical
notations added) (Levi-Strauss 1966:206).
(The tiames of racehorses have the quality they
do have because racehorses:) "do not form
part of human society either as subjects or
objects. Rather, they constttut~ the desocialised condition of a private society;
that which lives off race-courses:or frequents
them" (Levi-Strauss 1966:206).
Cattle are viewed as objects of economic value, with no interest in
thei r individual iden ti ties; they are; seEm in' re lationship to
humans merely as extensions of our technology. Racehorses, on the
other hand, are named in a way which will reflect their distincti veness and individual identi ties; though .isolated, ,they be long to
a society founded on competition, and are therefore paralle 1 to
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humans. Despite these differentiations, neither cattle nor
racehorses form an actual part of human society and are
therefore considered inhuman beings. L~vi-Strauss sums up
the situation with a statement which is totally recondite:

,

"If therefore birds are metaphorical human
beings and dogs metonymical human beings,
cattle may be thought of as metonymical
inhuman beings. Cattle are contiguous
only for want of similarity, racehorses
similar only for want of contiguity.
Each of these two categories offers the
converse image of one of the two other
categories, which themselvesstand in the
re lation of inverted symmetru'! (Levistrauss 1966:207).
I suspect that Levi-Strauss is playing semantic games.
Is the juxtaposition of a type of name and a type of social
context anything more than a debating trick? The train of
thought is fascinating, but what sort of "truth" is involved?
I am tempted to cast my lot with those who charge that Levistrauss is revealing more about the workings of his own mind
than about the subject matter proper!
Moving on to consideration of the "My thologiques" , we
find ourselves on even less sure footing. In fact, Von
Sturmer (1970:16) claims that one anthropologist has remarked that "reviewing the second book in the series was the
most arduous task of that sort he could remember havigg
assumed". My own exposure to the tetralogy is incomplete,
and unfortunately, no analysis of it, comparable to that by
Dejong on kinship and marriage, has, to my know~edge, been
published. Nevertheless ,I will attempt to give a brief
overview of the principles motivating Levi-Straussian myth
analysis.
MYTH
For some time previous to his actual involvement with
the analysis of myth, Levi-Strauss had been concerned with
the basic issue of how and why it is that men, who are a
part of nature, are able to see themselves ~s distinct from
nature, even though, in order to exist, they must continuously function as a part of nature. It was Levi-Strauss'
reasoning that the answer to this question would reveal itself in the context of myth analysis. As stated previously
in this paper, it is in the domron'of myth construction that
the mind is freed from the obligations and restrictions of
reali ty and is able, therefore, to display its innate low of
operation which reflects the structure of all men's minds.
Taken at face value, any body of mythological tales gives
the impression of a tremendous diversity of tri.vial

"
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incidents in association with frequent repetition and recurrent
emphasis on rather primary themes. L6vi-Strauss postulates that
behind the conspicuous sense of the tales there must be an inconspicuous non-sense, a message concealed in the Hcode l l of myth.
According to Gardner (1973:147),
"He tries to show that simple empirical categories - t~e perception of light, darkness,
smell, noise, silence, etc. - can be treated
as conceptual tools for such abstract ideas
as the relationship between Nature and Culture,
the characteristics of the incest taboo, and
the importance of certain kinsllip and social
arrangements; . and that these ideas, moreover,
can be incorporated into logical propositions".
Here, as elsewhere, Levi-Strauss' ultimate concern is with "the
unconscious nature of collective phenomena" (Levi-Strauss 1966:18).
By a sampling of the variety of myths produced cross-culturall
Levi-Strauss expected to be able to isolate those elements which
constitute the essen<;:e of myth. He was convinced that many of the
different myths in any culture operate with the same basic constituents, which do not have an accidental relationship to one
another, and that the rules for combination of the constituents
to transform one myth into another 'could be determined. After a
survey of more than 800 ,North and South American Indian myths,
Levi-Strauss claims to have found a formula for doing this and it
has been his intention to demonstrate, through the success of this
approach, the logic inherent in the body of myth.
In the. first two volumes of the flMythologiques", Levi-Strauss
is concerned with the eating of food and how,eating differentiates
man from other animals. The Raw and the Cooked is an attempt to
demonstrate a logic of ' properties based upon the opposition between
what is raw and therefore part of Nature, from what is cooked and
therefore part of Culture. It is L~vi-Strauss' proposition that,
on the plane of food, the distinction between raw and cooked is
the same as the distinction between Nature and Culture on the
plane of society, betWeen sacred and profane oh the plane of
religion, and between silence and noise on the plane of sound.
His justification for th~s proposition is roughly that, because we
are all men, '~e are all llart' of Nature; because we are human, we
are all part of ·Cu1ture. Survival as men requires the eating of
food (a part of Nature); survival a~umans require the utilization of social categories which are derived from cultural classifications imposed on elements of Nature. When we eat, a firect
identity is established between food (Nature) and ourselves (Culture); c()oking is thereby a uni vers al means of converting Nature
into Culture. . This line of' reasoning is expanded in From Honey to
Ashes, in which Levi-Strauss treis to demonstrate a logic of form,
between above/below; this world/other world, and (of course)
Nature/Culture, which is the foundation of the properties described
above. Honey i~,¥Quired from Nature and is consumed as food;
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tobacco is acquired through Culture and is consumed other
than as food.
It is Levi-Strauss' thesis that the function of mythology
is to exhibit publicly, though: in disguise, ordinarily .unconscious paradoxes of the kind described, and that the
ultimate conclusion of analysis is not that all myths say
the same thing but that, taken collectively, what all myths
say is said collectively. Having not read the final two
volumes of the "Mythologiques 11, I cannot speak personally
of their content and will demur to the excellent summary of
the material as presented by Gardner (1973:148):
"The Mythologiques represent, overall,
Levi-Strauss' comprehensive effort to
demonstrate that all patterns of human
behavior are codes; that the mind's
inherent structuring tendency- operating
in terms of a limited set of inborn principles - conditions and determines the
form of social phenomena, and of important
forms of relations among human beings:
differences in status, networks of friendship, feelings of hostility, etc. Such
relations are dealt with in myths by means
of various codes relating to categories of
food, sound or silence, smell and taste
landscapes, seasonal changes, climate,
celestial bodies, shelter, animal and
plant life. The terms or objects appearing in myths may differ, but the underlying laws of discourse, and the operative
ecological and social constraints, are invariable. Myths are designed to deal with
problems of human existence which seem insoluble; they embody and express such
dilemmas in the coherently structured form,
and so serve to render them intelligible'.
Through their structural similarity to
given 'real world" situations,myths establish a point of repose or equilibrium
which men can come to grips with the crucial
components of the problem, and become aware
of the 'fix' they are in. Thus, a myth is
both intellectually satisfying and socially
solidifying".
SUMMARY AND .. CON.eLUSIONS

An evaluation of "!the work of L€vi-Strauss can only be
assessed in operational terms. If, by application of the
techniques of analysis expounded by Levi-Strauss to an
actual body of anthropological data, one is able to discern
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insights not had before and if these insights provide illumination
of other related ethnographic ~aterial which were not previously
considered, then the exercise has been worthwhile.
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